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                             OPINION 
                                            
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
          This appeal requires us to determine whether a 
limitation of damages provision, contained in a proposed, but 
never accepted, written agreement between a purchaser and a 
distributor, will preclude the purchaser from seeking damages 
against the manufacturer of a product sold to the purchaser by 
the distributor.  We conclude that because the proposed agreement 
between the distributor and the purchaser was never accepted by 
the distributor, and, therefore, never went into force, the 
manufacturer is not protected by the limitation of damages 
provisions.  We further hold that since the written agreement 
never went into effect, the jury's award of damages should not 
have been based on or limited to the terms contained in the 
written agreement.  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of 
the district court and remand for a new trial on liability and 
damages. 
                               I. 
                               A. 
          Appellant, InfoComp ("InfoComp" or "the purchaser"), 
seeks damages arising from its purchase of an allegedly defective 
computer imagesetting system manufactured by Appellee, Chelgraph 
Ltd. ("Chelgraph" or "the manufacturer").  InfoComp purchased the 
product from a Chelgraph distributor, Electra Products, Inc. 
("Electra" or "the distributor").  Chelgraph manufactures various 
types of advanced printing and compugrahphic equipment.  Electra 
was an independent distributor of Chelgraph products.  InfoComp 
provided graphic design and printing services to clients.   
          InfoComp periodically purchased equipment to enable the 
company to take advantage of technological advances in its 
industry.  After considerable research, InfoComp's president and 
owner, Timothy P. Hornish, informed Kevin P. Mahony, national 
sales manager for Electra, that InfoComp would purchase the 
Chelgraph IBX-2000 imagesetting system.  Thereafter, Mahony faxed 
InfoComp pre-printed forms and two letters, which set forth 
prices, payment schedules and delivery terms.  Electra's name, 
address, and logo appeared on the front of the forms, and the 
first numbered paragraph defined the term "Electra" as referring 
only to Electra.  Nowhere in the forms was Chelgraph mentioned or 
even identified.  The reverse side of the forms contained the 
following language: 
          This Purchase Agreement shall not be deemed accepted by 
          Electra unless and until an authorized officer or 
          manager of Electra has signed the Purchase Agreement.  
          No other act or writing by an agent, officer, or 
          manager of Electra shall cause this Purchase Agreement 
          to be a valid, effective or binding contract on 
          Electra.  
  
App. at 1836.  Under the heading "Installation and Service," the 
following limitation of damages provision was also contained in 
the forms: 
          Electra shall not be liable for any special, 
          incidental, resulting, or consequential damages 
          (whether caused by or resulting from Electra's 
          negligence or breach) directly or indirectly arising 
          from the use, inability to use, attempted use, failure 
          to deliver or delay in delivery of, or from a defect 
          in, or a breach by or failure to conform of the 
          Equipment, or any repair or replacement parts thereof, 
          ordered from Electra for use in conjunction therewith, 
          or from any other cause whatsoever.  
 
Id.   The forms also contained an integration clause stating that 
the proposed written agreement constituted the complete 
understanding between the parties and that no representations or 
warranties made elsewhere were of any effect.  Id. 
          InfoComp signed and returned the forms along with a 
check for the appropriate down payment in late December of 1989.  
Electra cashed the check and two other checks sent in accordance 
with the faxed letters.  But Electra failed to meet the 
requirement of the proposed agreement that one of its authorized 
officers or managers sign the pre-printed form agreements at its 
home office in order for the agreement to be considered accepted 
by Electra.   
          InfoComp contended that the machinery sold to it by 
Electra failed to perform in all material respects.  Electra made 
several attempts to repair the equipment after receiving 
complaints from InfoComp.  InfoComp continued to assert that the 
machine was not satisfactory.  In the winter of 1990-91 InfoComp 
advised both Electra and Chelgraph that it was rejecting the 
machine and requested a full refund.  Both Electra and Chelgraph 
refused to refund the purchase price.  Chelgraph maintained that 
it was not responsible for InfoComp's numerous problems because 
of the limitation of damages clause contained in InfoComp's 
proposed agreement with Electra.  In addition, Chelgraph 
maintained that the limitation of damages clause in its own 
distributor's contract with Electra was enforceable by Chelgraph 
against InfoComp even though: 1) InfoComp had no knowledge of the 
Chelgraph-Electra distributor's contract; 2) the Chelgraph- 
Electra distributor's contract was concluded months after 
InfoComp signed its agreement with Electra; 3) the proposed 
InfoComp-Electra agreement made no reference to Chelgraph; and 4) 
InfoComp had no notice that Chelgraph sought to limit its 
liability against ultimate purchasers such as InfoComp. 
 
 
                               B. 
          The district court denied InfoComp's motion to preclude 
evidence concerning the exculpatory and limitation of damages 
provisions contained in the proposed InfoComp-Electra purchase 
agreements, which were prepared by Electra.  InfoComp's motion 
was based on the principle that the damages provisions——which 
prohibited recovery for consequential and incidental 
damages——never came into effect under Pennsylvania law because 
the agreement expressly stated that it was not to be deemed 
accepted by Electra unless signed by an official at Electra's 
home office.  The agreement presented to the district court was 
unsigned, and Chelgraph was unable to prove that the agreement 
was signed by an official at the home office of Electra. 
          The district court found that the limitation of damages 
provision in the proposed agreement between Electra and InfoComp 
was not only effective but was also binding on InfoComp in its 
claims against Chelgraph.  Since many of the claims of InfoComp 
were within the sweep of the limitation of damages provision, the 
district court granted Chelgraph's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on InfoComp's claims of breach of contract, breach 
of implied warranties, fraud, and misrepresentation.  The sole 
claim on which InfoComp was permitted to go forward against 
Chelgraph was for breach of the written agreement's 90-day 
warranty provision against defective material, poor workmanship, 
and nonconformity with the system's written specifications as to 
functions and processes.  On that claim, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of InfoComp. 
II. 
                                      The district court exercised 
jurisdiction pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the district 
court's interpretation and application of state law is plenary.  
Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1496 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hofkin 
v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 
1996)).  All parties agree that their dispute is governed by 
Pennsylvania law. 
                              III. 
          We first address the effect of the InfoComp-Electra 
purchase agreement.  In Franklin Interiors v. Wall of Fame 
Management Company, 510 Pa. 597, 601, 511 A.2d 761, 763 (1986), 
the parties' agreement stated that "[t]he document does not 
become a contract until approved by an officer of Franklin 
Interiors."  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this 
sentence, "inserted in this document by the Appellee, clearly and 
unambiguously required [the Appellee] to execute the document," 
and noted that "it is hornbook law" that a written agreement will 
have no effect "until accepted in the mode and manner expressly 
provided by the terms of the offer."  Id. at 600-601, 511 A.2d at 
762-763.  The court explained that this holds true "even though 
the subsequent performance by the parties may give rise to a 
binding contract between them."  Id. at 600, 511 A.2d at 762.   
          In his multi-volume treatise on the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), Ronald Anderson explains that "[a] seller can validly 
specify that no contract arises until the acceptance made by the 
seller is approved by the seller's home office."  2 Ronald A. 
Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-206:27 (3d 
ed. 1982) (citing West Penn Power Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
236 Pa. Super. 413, 348 A.2d 144 (1975)).  Such is precisely the 
fact pattern before us.  As Franklin Interiors indicates, when an 
offeror fails to comply with its own conditions precedent to 
contract formation, that party may not claim the benefits of the 
proposed contract (including any limitations on damages and 
remedies).   
          This principle, which remains the unchallenged law of 
Pennsylvania, was first developed in West Penn Power and Franklin 
Interiors and later strictly applied in Cucchi v. Rollins 
Protective Services Company, 377 Pa. Super. 9, 546 A. 2d 1131 
(1988).  In Cucchi, a lessor was barred from asserting a 
limitation on liability provision in a contract because that 
contract had not been signed by a representative of its home 
office.  Although the contract in Cucchi had been signed by a 
branch office representative, the court construed the agreement 
strictly and found the lack of a home office signature to be 
dispositive.  Id. at 13, 18-19.  Here, the proposed contract also 
recited that a home office signature was essential to contract 
formation.  There is no evidence that any Electra employee ever 
signed the written agreement, let alone an employee at the home 
office.  The law of Pennsylvania firmly establishes that the 
absence of the required signature is prima facie proof that the 
contract is not effective: 
          The Appellee, through its officers, never entered its 
          signature on the document to evidence approval as 
          required by its terms.  This is clearly a facial 
          defect. . . .  [T]here is no evidence in this record to 
          sustain the facially defective contract, and Superior 
          Court clearly erred in considering any information 
          [outside] the record to correct that defect. 
 
Franklin Interiors, 510 Pa. at 600-601, 511 A.2d at 762-763.  
          The court in Cucchi explained that "a written 
instrument must be strictly construed against its maker.  . . .   
Since the [lessor] had failed to follow its own conditions of 
acceptance, [it] could not rely on the [limitation on liability 
provision]."  377 Pa. Super. at 18, 546 A.2d at 1135 (citation 
omitted).  That court noted, as do we, that  
          although it ha[s] always been the law that only the 
          party against whom a warrant is intended to bind must 
          sign it because the law assumes assent of the person in 
          whose favor it is drawn, the law [i]s of no avail to 
          the appellee.  No assumption [can] be made that the 
          appellee assented to the warrant because it expressly 
          conditioned acceptance of all the contract terms upon 
          its execution of the document. 
 
Id. at 18-19, 546 A.2d at 1136 (citing Franklin Interiors).  This 
principle is so firmly embedded in Pennsylvania jurisprudence 
that the Cucchi court stated, "the fact that both parties may 
have initially believed the written contract to be binding upon 
themselves did not make it so [because its express terms were not 
met]." Id. at 17, 546 A.2d at 1135. 
          In the matter now before us, because the written 
agreement was never in effect between Electra and InfoComp, a 
fortiori Chelgraph (a non-party to the proposed agreement) cannot 
find protection in the limitation of damages provision contained 
in that proposed agreement.  A contract has been formed between 
InfoComp and Electra in this case by reason of their performance.  
The terms of that contract, however, are governed by the 
provisions of the UCC as adopted in Pennsylvania, not the 
proposed written agreement that was never accepted by Electra.  
The UCC explicitly provides that incidental and consequential 
damages are available to purchasers in appropriate cases.  13 Pa. 
C.S.A. §§ 2714, 2715. 
 
                              IV. 
          The contract that exists between the parties arises 
from the UCC and Pennsylvania general contracts law, not the 
terms of the proposed written agreement.  It follows that just as 
the proposed agreement does not provide Chelgraph and Electra 
with protection against the measure or amount of damages, it 
cannot determine the legal grounds and terms of liability upon 
which InfoComp may recover against Electra and Chelgraph.  For 
this reason, the following passage in the written agreement, as 
well as all other terms, is of no effect:  
          This Agreement embodies the full and complete 
          understanding between the parties, and no modification 
          or waiver of any terms or conditions hereof, nor any 
          representations or warranties shall be of any force or 
          effect unless in writing and signed by an authorized 
          officer or manager of Electra. 
 
App. at 1836.  Erroneously believing the proposed written 
agreement to be in effect, the district court instructed the jury 
that  
          you may only look to the written purchase agreement to 
          determine whether a warranty existed, whether the 
          Chelgraph defendants breached the warranty, and whether 
          the breach of warranty was a substantial factor in 
          causing the harm to the plaintiff. 
 
App. at 1642.  The district court explained to jurors that 
although InfoComp allegedly received "certain oral 
representations [and] representations in written advertisements, 
promotional materials, and samples issued by Electra and 
Chelgraph that the IBX-2000 had certain characteristics," the 
jury could not consider any of the evidence external to the 
agreement in assessing liability.  Id.   
          Since the proposed written agreement is not in force, 
the jury should have been advised that it was free to consider 
all representations that were made to InfoComp by Electra and 
Chelgraph, not merely those contained in the written agreement.  
While the proposed written agreement may be evidence of the 
parties' intent and actions, it never went into effect as a 
binding contract.  Accordingly, it cannot be the sole legal basis 
for InfoComp's recovery against Chelgraph.   
          InfoComp has appealed for a new trial solely on the 
issue of damages.  A retrial limited to damages would be 
inappropriate under the facts of this case.  See, e.g., Williams 
v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1995)(intertwined nature of 
liability and damages requires new trial on all issues); Kirk v. 
Raymark Industries, Inc., 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995)(magnitude of 
trial error demands new trial on liability and damages); Advanced 
Medical, Inc., v. Arden Medical Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 188 (3d 
Cir. 1992)(erroneous interpretation as to admissibility of 
evidence necessitates retrial on both liability and damages).   
          The district court inaccurately instructed the jury 
that the liability of Chelgraph should be determined under the 
written contract. The jury instructions improperly constrained 
not only the type of damages awarded, but the range of evidence 
the jury could consider in determining what representations had 
been made to InfoComp.  For this reason, when the case returns to 
the district court, the jury must be free to consider the matter 
of both liability and damages, without any limitation on either 
party by reason of the proposed written agreement.     
                               V. 
          Chelgraph has argued that the proposed InfoComp-Electra 
limitation of damages provisions should inure to the benefit of 
Chelgraph.  In King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1053 (3d Cir. 
1988), we explained that under Pennsylvania law the liability of 
manufacturers will not be waived by remote purchasers unless the 
disclaimer is "clearly communicated to the remote [purchaser] 
prior to his or her purchase."  Communication of the limitation 
clause from the manufacturer to the remote purchaser is vital; 
without more, a limitation clause addressing only the distributor 
and the purchaser has no effect on the manufacturer.  See id.King offers 
two examples of methods manufacturers may employ to 
notify remote purchasers of their desire to limit liability: (1) 
displaying a conspicuous provision in the literature included 
with the product, and (2) contracting with the distributor to 
expressly reference manufacturer's limitation of liability in the 
distributor's contracts with its customers.  Id. at 1054 
(citations omitted).  King is the most recent statement of 
Pennsylvania law in this area, and Chelgraph failed to employ any 
method to satisfy King's holding that remote purchasers must be 
specifically notified of a manufacturer's intent to limit damages 
if that limitation is to be effective. 
          The facts of the present case represent an a fortiorimatter from 
King:  Even if Chelgraph had endeavored to limit its 
liability by or through the proposed agreement between Electra 
and InfoComp, that written contract never came into existence.  
The proposed written agreement was never accepted according to 
its own explicit terms.  As a result, the sale that went forward 
between Electra and InfoComp was the product of an unwritten 
agreement subject to the full range of provisions contained in 
the UCC.   
                              VI. 
          For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of 
December 21, 1995, will be vacated.  We will remand this matter 
to the district court for trial on both liability and damages 
consistent with this opinion.  Such trial shall be without 
limitation on damages by reason of the proposed written agreement 
between Electra and InfoComp.  
          Costs taxed against Appellee.  
